Australian Army Intelligence Operations Vietnam War 1968
Film is taken on my 8mm standard movie camera during my work in Vietnam as a Counter-Intelligence Operator in 1968. Many soldiers are idealists, and many civilians are victims, but we are not so naive that we don’t understand that wars are a racket for internationalist globalists to progress towards turning countries into territories that can they dominate through banking, etc. It took me 3 conflicts I fought in to gain some understanding. My experiences in these 3 conflicts (Korea, Borneo and Vietnam) are set down in my book ‘Three Wars A Soldier’ available at Amazon.
Hi All, Johny Bineham’s 8mm footage is unique – particularly of Baria Town during Tet 1968 and the “Acorn” snatch operations of Viet Cong “infrastructure” (VCI) cadre in the villages. Brigadier R.L. Hughes – Commander 1 ATF from 20 October 1967, “gradually phased out cordon-and-search operations. They required a large manpower effort, normally involving one battalion, and sometimes the entire task force. … In their place, Hughes said, ‘we developed a series of little operations, we called ‘acorn operations’ (named after the radio callsign used to refer to intelligence officers and units). He explained … Within half-an-hour you could pick up your half a dozen, or so, suspects and get out again, with no problems at all. … acorn operations were in Hughes’ opinion, most effective in targeting the Viet Cong infrastructure: they caused considerable consternation to the Viet Cong and disrupted their activities while requiring minimal task force resources.”
In May 1969 – noting the risks of enemy armed resistance during Div Int’s Acorn Operations, HQ 1 ATF promulgated GS Instruction 4/69 on “Acorn Security Squads” that directed the Special Air Service (SAS) Squadron and 1 Field Regiment RAA to provide armed squads to support Det 1 Div Int Unit’s Acorn Operations. These SAS and Field Regiment “flying squads” were to be at ‘’two hours notice-to-move” and “to operate under orders of OC Det 1 Div Int Unit” who would brief them “on the concept of operations and conduct.” This GS Instruction also specifically clarified that offensive Acorn Operations were planned and initiated by the Detachment with support from other ‘arms Corps’ elements assigned under Det 1 Div Int Unit command.
Johny Bineham’s material – information from his 8mm film and his 2013 book has been an important contribution to the book: Uprooting the Viet Cong Underground: Acorn Intelligence Operations in Phước Tuy Province (and the Phoenix Program) – to be distributed later this year.
Hi All, Recently, a US Vietnam veteran colleague (intelligence officer, linguist, two plus years in-country) offered his analysis of a seeming “geographic disparity” in US combat frequency/intensity across South Vietnam’s 44 provinces:
“No place was safe in Viet Nam? This is often heard and read and essentially reflects ignorance. 65% of American combat fatalities took place in the 12 provinces, from Hau Nghia ((MR3 – bordering Cambodian border/Parrot’s Beak)) north to Quang Tri ((northernmost province in MR 1)), bordering either Cambodia, or Laos, or Laos and North Viet Nam. 35% of remaining combat fatalities occurred in the remaining 32 provinces of Viet Nam. Clearly, some provinces were far more lethal than others. 8,099 Americans were killed in Quang Nam province ((MR 1)), while 32 died in Phu Bon ((central MR2 – bounded by coastal Binh Dinh and Phu Yen provinces; and to the west by Pleiku and Darlac provinces – ie that bordered Cambodia)).”
Similarly, several of 1 ATF’s major engagements took place outside the boundaries of Phuoc Tuy Province – eg:
The Battle of Coral (Bien Hoa Province, 12 May – 6 June 1968);
The Battle of Balmoral (southern Binh Duong Province), 26 & 28 May 1968); and
The Battle of FSPB Andersen (Bien Hoa Province, 17-28 February 1968 ; Operation Coburg).
Regards, to all.